作者：John Haldon約翰·哈爾頓

出版商：Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

自翻：流瀲紫琳

The fighting：Organising for war

戰(zhàn)斗：組織的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)

The evolution of tactical administration

戰(zhàn)術(shù)管理的演變

????????? There were important changes in tactical structures over the period from the 6th to the 11th century, and again from the later 11th to the 12th centuries and beyond. Units of the middle of the 6th century varied considerably in their regimental organisation. The older legions and auxiliary forces continued to exist through the 3rd and 4th centuries, divided into alae of cavalry and cohortes of infantry, nominally of 500 and 1,000 men respectively; although under Constantine 1 (324-37), new infantry units called auxilia often replaced these cohortes. Newer legions, numbering 1,000-1,500, had also been created during the 2nd and 3rd centuries, and this number seems also to have applied to the original legions by the 4th century. Apart from these were units called vexillationes, originally detachments from various units formed for a particular reason during the period c.150-250, which had been turned into permanent units in their own right. This term, vexillation, was applied in the 4th century to most of the new cavalry units recruited at that time. Although some of these technical differences survived into the 6th century, the general term for most units was by then the word ailments or its Greek equivalent, arithmos or tagma, which simply meant 'unit' or 'number' (of soldiers).

（從6世紀(jì)到11世紀(jì)，戰(zhàn)術(shù)結(jié)構(gòu)發(fā)生了重大變化，從11世紀(jì)后期到12世紀(jì)，以及以后的時(shí)期也發(fā)生了重大變化。6 世紀(jì)中葉的部隊(duì)在團(tuán)組織上有很大差異。舊的軍團(tuán)和輔助部隊(duì)一直存在到 3 世紀(jì)和 4 世紀(jì)，分為騎兵部隊(duì)和步兵部隊(duì)，名義上分別有 500 人和 1,000 人；盡管在君士坦丁一世（324-37）的統(tǒng)治下，稱為輔助的新步兵部隊(duì)經(jīng)常取代這些部隊(duì)。2 世紀(jì)和 3 世紀(jì)還創(chuàng)建了編號(hào)為 1,000-1,500 的新軍團(tuán)，這個(gè)數(shù)字似乎也適用于 4 世紀(jì)的原始軍團(tuán)。除了這些單位之外，還有稱為 vexillationes 的單位，最初是在 150-250 年期間出于特定原因從各種單位組成的分遣隊(duì)，這些分遣隊(duì)本身已經(jīng)變成了永久性單位。這個(gè)術(shù)語，vexillation，在 4 世紀(jì)被應(yīng)用于當(dāng)時(shí)招募的大多數(shù)新騎兵部隊(duì)。盡管其中一些技術(shù)差異一直延續(xù)到 6 世紀(jì)，但當(dāng)時(shí)大多數(shù)單位的通用術(shù)語是“ailments”一詞或其希臘的等量、arithmos 或 tagma，僅表示“單位”或“數(shù)量”（士兵）。）

????????? Byzantine tactics and strategy had to adapt quickly to the situation following the Arab conquests in the middle of the 7th century. Armies along the frontiers are often referred to as kaballarika themata 'cavalry armies' - showing that light cavalry had come to dominate the warfare of the period, much of which involved skirmishing and hit-and-run raids. But while infantry continued to be needed, and played an important part in many campaigns, their value appears slowly to have declined, to some extent reflecting social factors, since they were drawn mostly from the poorest of the provincial soldiery. The development of infantry tactics after the period of the first Islamic conquests, along with the higher profile of mounted warfare, therefore, reflected the strategic situation in which the empire found itself. During the period from the later 7th to the 9th or early 10th centuries, the differences which once existed between the different types of infantry and cavalry were subject to a general levelling out of the different arms, into light cavalry and infantry. Only the tagmata at Constantinople seem to have provided a heavy cavalry force. It seems to have been the responsibility of local officers in the provinces to establish field units and to arm them as each specific occasion required. The sizes of units on the battlefield varied according to tactical need; there seems to have been no fixed number for the different formations, with figures recommended for the smallest infantry units, the banda, for example, ranging from as few as 150 to as many as 400. Several tourmai could appear on campaign as a single large division, for example, or vice versa. Most themes had two or three divisions or tourmai, but this does not mean that they were the same size or could muster the same number of soldiers.

（拜占庭的戰(zhàn)術(shù)和戰(zhàn)略必須迅速適應(yīng) 7 世紀(jì)中葉阿拉伯征服之后的形勢(shì)。 邊境沿線的軍隊(duì)通常被稱為 kaballarika 軍區(qū)'騎兵軍隊(duì)' - 表明輕騎兵已經(jīng)主導(dǎo)了這一時(shí)期的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，其中大部分涉及小規(guī)模沖突和打了就跑的襲擊。但是，雖然步兵仍然需要，并在許多戰(zhàn)役中發(fā)揮重要作用，但他們的價(jià)值似乎慢慢下降，在某種程度上反映了社會(huì)因素，因?yàn)樗麄兇蠖鄟碜允?nèi)最貧窮的士兵。因此，第一次伊斯蘭征服時(shí)期后步兵戰(zhàn)術(shù)的發(fā)展，以及更高調(diào)的騎兵戰(zhàn)，反映了帝國(guó)所處的戰(zhàn)略形勢(shì)。7世紀(jì)后期至9世紀(jì)或10世紀(jì)初期，不同類型的步兵和騎兵之間曾經(jīng)存在的差異受到了不同兵種的普遍拉平，分為輕騎兵和步兵。 只有君士坦丁堡的塔格瑪塔似乎提供了一支重騎兵部隊(duì)。各省的地方官員似乎有責(zé)任建立野戰(zhàn)部隊(duì)，并根據(jù)每個(gè)特定場(chǎng)合的需要武裝他們。 戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上的單位大小因戰(zhàn)術(shù)需要而異； 不同的編隊(duì)似乎沒有固定的人數(shù)，建議最小的步兵單位（例如班達(dá)）的人數(shù)從少至 150 人到多至 400 人不等。戰(zhàn)役中可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)幾支大部隊(duì) 例如，除法，反之亦然。大多數(shù)主題有兩三個(gè)師或圖爾邁，但這并不意味著它們的規(guī)模相同或可以召集相同數(shù)量的士兵。）

????????? The provincial armies were organised into what we would refer to as divisions, brigades and regiments — tourmai, drouggoi and banda. The first and last were also districts of their thema, or military region. Each Murata had a headquarters or base in a fortified town or fortress. Each bandon was identified with a particular locality from which its soldiers were recruited. Each tourmarthes, or commander of a tourma, was an important figure in the military administration of his theme, responsible for the fortresses and strongpoints in his district, as well as for the safety of the local population and their goods and chattels. His most important responsibility before the middle of the 10th century, however, was dealing with raids into his territory and informing his superiors of enemy movements.

（省級(jí)軍隊(duì)被組織成我們所說的師、旅和團(tuán)——圖爾邁、德魯戈伊和班達(dá)。第一個(gè)和最后一個(gè)也是他們的主題區(qū)或軍區(qū)。每個(gè)村田在一個(gè)設(shè)防的城鎮(zhèn)或要塞中都有一個(gè)總部或基地。每個(gè)班都有一個(gè)特定的地方，其士兵是從那里招募的。 每個(gè)圖爾瑪特，或圖爾瑪?shù)慕y(tǒng)帥，都是其主題軍事管理中的重要人物，負(fù)責(zé)其地區(qū)的堡壘和據(jù)點(diǎn)，以及當(dāng)?shù)鼐用窦捌湄浳锖蛣?dòng)產(chǎn)的安全。然而，在 10 世紀(jì)中葉之前，他最重要的職責(zé)是處理對(duì)他領(lǐng)土的襲擊，并向他的上級(jí)通報(bào)敵人的動(dòng)向。）

????????? During the course of the 10th century the army evolved a much more offensive tactical structure, the main causes being the need to recruit more professional soldiers, and the need to operate effectively on campaigns which demanded more than the seasonally available theme armies. The main changes were the introduction of a corps of heavy cavalry armed with lances and maces, which could operate effectively alongside infantry, and which substantially enhanced the aggressive power of the Byzantine cavalry, together with the revival of a corps of disciplined, effective heavy infantry, able to stand firm in the line of battle, confront enemy infantry and cavalry, march long distances and function as garrison troops away from their home territory on a permanent basis. At the same time, the army leadership developed new battlefield tactics, so that commanders had a flexible yet hard-hitting force at their disposal that could respond appropriately to a range of different situations.

（在10世紀(jì)的過程中，軍隊(duì)發(fā)展了更具進(jìn)攻性的戰(zhàn)術(shù)結(jié)構(gòu)，主要原因是需要招募更多的專業(yè)士兵，以及需要在需要比季節(jié)性可用的主題軍隊(duì)更多的戰(zhàn)役中有效運(yùn)作。主要的變化是引入了一支裝備長(zhǎng)矛和狼牙棒的重騎兵部隊(duì)，它們可以與步兵一起有效地作戰(zhàn)，大大增強(qiáng)了拜占庭騎兵的攻擊力，同時(shí)復(fù)興了一支訓(xùn)練有素、有效的重步兵部隊(duì)，能夠在戰(zhàn)線中站穩(wěn)腳跟，對(duì)抗敵軍步兵和騎兵，長(zhǎng)距離行軍，并作為駐軍長(zhǎng)期遠(yuǎn)離家鄉(xiāng)領(lǐng)土。同時(shí)，軍隊(duì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層開發(fā)了新的戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)術(shù)，使指揮官擁有一支靈活而有力的力量，可以對(duì)各種不同的情況做出適當(dāng)?shù)姆磻?yīng)。）

????????? The remarkable successes achieved by Byzantine armies in the second half of the 10th century in particular, under a series of very able commanders, and described in the historical accounts of the period, corroborate the evidence of the tactical treatises. In one tract a new formation of infantry soldiers is described, consisting of troops wielding thick-stocked, long-necked javelins or pikes, whose task it was to face and turn back enemy heavy cavalry attacks. Twenty years later the tactic had evolved further, so that there were in each major infantry unit of 1,000 men 100 soldiers so equipped, integrated with 400 ordinary spearmen, 300 archers and 200 light infantry (with slings and javelins). This important change in the role of infantry was reflected in the changed political and military situation of the 10th century. In the late 6th century cavalry began to achieve a certain pre-eminence in military organisation and tactics, whereas the 10th-century texts give infantry formations equal or even preferential treatment. Infantry became once more a key element in the army, both in terms of numbers as well as tactics, a clear contrast to the situation in the preceding centuries. The new tactics were embodied in a new formation, in which infantry and cavalry worked together, essentially a hollow square or rectangle, depending on the terrain, designed to cope with encircling movements from hostile cavalry, as a refuge for Byzantine mounted units when forced to retreat, and as a means of strengthening infantry cohesiveness and morale. Infantry were no longer drawn up in a deep line with a largely defensive role, but actively integrated into the offensive heavy cavalry tactics of the period. And a very important aspect of the change was a focus on the recruitment of good infantry from war-like peoples within the empire, especially Armenians. The demand for uniformity in tactical function and therefore equipment and weaponry meant that the Byzantine infantry of this period were more like their classical Roman predecessors than anything in the intervening period.

（特別是在 10 世紀(jì)下半葉，拜占庭軍隊(duì)在一系列非常能干的指揮官的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下取得的顯著成功，并在該時(shí)期的歷史記載中有所描述，證實(shí)了戰(zhàn)術(shù)論文的證據(jù)。 在一篇短文中，描述了一種新的步兵編隊(duì)，由揮舞著厚實(shí)長(zhǎng)頸標(biāo)槍或長(zhǎng)矛的部隊(duì)組成，其任務(wù)是面對(duì)和擊退敵人的重騎兵攻擊。20年后，戰(zhàn)術(shù)進(jìn)一步發(fā)展，每個(gè)1000人的主要步兵單位都有100名士兵，配備400名普通長(zhǎng)矛手、300名弓箭手和200名輕步兵（帶投石索和標(biāo)槍）。步兵角色的這一重要變化反映在 10 世紀(jì)政治和軍事形勢(shì)的變化中。6 世紀(jì)后期，騎兵開始在軍事組織和戰(zhàn)術(shù)上取得某種優(yōu)勢(shì)，而 10 世紀(jì)的文本則給予步兵編隊(duì)同等甚至優(yōu)惠待遇。步兵再次成為軍隊(duì)中的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素，無論是在數(shù)量上還是戰(zhàn)術(shù)上，這與前幾個(gè)世紀(jì)的情況形成鮮明對(duì)比。新戰(zhàn)術(shù)體現(xiàn)在一種新的編隊(duì)中，其中步兵和騎兵一起工作，基本上是一個(gè)空心的正方形或矩形，取決于地形，旨在應(yīng)對(duì)敵方騎兵的包圍運(yùn)動(dòng)，作為拜占庭騎兵部隊(duì)被迫逃跑時(shí)的避難所。撤退，并作為加強(qiáng)步兵凝聚力和士氣的一種手段。步兵不再以防守為主，而是積極融入當(dāng)時(shí)的重騎兵進(jìn)攻戰(zhàn)術(shù)。變化的一個(gè)非常重要的方面是專注于從帝國(guó)內(nèi)好戰(zhàn)的民族，尤其是亞美尼亞人中招募優(yōu)秀的步兵。對(duì)戰(zhàn)術(shù)功能以及裝備和武器的統(tǒng)一要求意味著這一時(shí)期的拜占庭步兵更像是他們的古典羅馬前輩，而不是中間時(shí)期的任何東西。）

????????? New formations of cavalry appear, heavily armoured troops armed from head to foot in lamellar, mail and quilting, whose horses were likewise protected. Face, neck, flanks and forequarters were all to be covered with armour to prevent enemy missiles and blows from injuring the cavalryman's mount. Known as kataphraktoi or klibarrophoroi, they were relatively few in number due to the expense of maintaining them, and were the elite strike force in each field army, drawn up in a broad-nosed wedge with their only function to smash through the enemy heavy cavalry or infantry line, disrupt his formation, and open it up to permit supporting horse- and foot-soldiers to exploit the situation. Contemporary writers, both Byzantine and Arab, comment on the effects of this formation on their foes. The imperial armies achieved a powerful reputation, to the extent that by the 1030s the mere threat of an imperial army marching into northern Syria was enough to keep the local Muslim emirs in check. Yet while these successes were the result of a combination of good organisation and logistics, intelligent tactics, well-armed, trained and disciplined soldiers, and good morale, the key always remained the competence and effectiveness of the general in command. An army is only as good as its leadership, however, and although tactical order and training certainly gave Byzantine armies through much of the empire's history an obvious advantage, incompetent officers were the bane of the system: dependence on the charisma and intelligence of its leaders was one of the most significant in-built weaknesses of the imperial military system at the tactical level. During the middle of the 11th century, and in a context of short-sighted strategic planning and internal political conflict, this produced serious problems and led to the erosion of the effectiveness of both the field armies and the provincial defences.

（新的騎兵編隊(duì)出現(xiàn)了，全副武裝的部隊(duì)從頭到腳用板甲、鏈甲和絎縫武裝，他們的馬匹同樣受到保護(hù)。面部、頸部、側(cè)腹和前軀都被裝甲覆蓋，以防止敵人的導(dǎo)彈和打擊傷害騎兵的坐騎。被稱為 kataphraktoi 或 klibarrophoroi，由于維護(hù)它們的費(fèi)用，它們的數(shù)量相對(duì)較少，并且是每個(gè)野戰(zhàn)軍中的精銳打擊力量，被編成一個(gè)寬闊的楔子，唯一的功能是粉碎敵人的重騎兵 或步兵線，擾亂他的陣型，并打開它以允許支持的馬和步兵利用這種情況。拜占庭和阿拉伯的當(dāng)代作家都評(píng)論了這種形式對(duì)他們的敵人的影響。帝國(guó)軍隊(duì)贏得了強(qiáng)大的聲譽(yù)，以至于到 1030 年代，僅憑帝國(guó)軍隊(duì)進(jìn)入敘利亞北部的威脅就足以控制當(dāng)?shù)氐哪滤沽职Ｃ谞?。然而，盡管這些成功是良好的組織和后勤、聰明的戰(zhàn)術(shù)、裝備精良、訓(xùn)練有素和紀(jì)律嚴(yán)明的士兵以及士氣高漲的結(jié)果，但關(guān)鍵始終是指揮官的能力和有效性。然而，一支軍隊(duì)的好壞取決于它的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)能力，盡管在帝國(guó)歷史的大部分時(shí)間里，戰(zhàn)術(shù)秩序和訓(xùn)練確實(shí)給拜占庭軍隊(duì)帶來了明顯的優(yōu)勢(shì)，但無能的軍官是該系統(tǒng)的禍根：依賴其領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的魅力和智慧是帝國(guó)軍事系統(tǒng)在戰(zhàn)術(shù)層面上最重要的內(nèi)在弱點(diǎn)之一。在 11 世紀(jì)中葉，在短視的戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃和內(nèi)部政治沖突的背景下，這產(chǎn)生了嚴(yán)重的問題，導(dǎo)致野戰(zhàn)軍和省級(jí)防御的有效性受到侵蝕。）

????????? As the demands of offensive warfare required the employment of ever greater numbers of professional, mercenary soldiers, both indigenous and foreign, so many of the provincial, thematic units of the imperial armies were neglected, especially in the period after the death of Basil II in 1025. Michael Attaleiates, a contemporary of the Mantikert campaign who travelled with the imperial entourage, paints a sad picture of the state of the thematic levy raised for the campaign of 1071, remarking that the provincial troops were entirely unfitted for warfare — they had been neither mustered nor paid or supplied with their traditional provisions for many years. Yet his account of the campaigns of the dynamic emperor Romanos IV in the years 1068-71 shows that the imperial armies still possessed an order, discipline and cohesion when properly led.

（由于進(jìn)攻戰(zhàn)的需要，帝國(guó)雇用越來越多的本地和外國(guó)專業(yè)雇傭兵，因此帝國(guó)軍隊(duì)的許多省級(jí)軍區(qū)單位被忽視，特別是在巴西爾二世去世后的時(shí)期。1025年與帝國(guó)隨行人員一起旅行的 Mantikert 戰(zhàn)役的同時(shí)代人 Michael Attaleiates 描繪了為 1071 年戰(zhàn)役征集的軍區(qū)征兵的悲慘畫面，并指出省級(jí)軍隊(duì)完全不適合戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)——他們已經(jīng)多年來，既沒有召集，也沒有支付或提供他們的傳統(tǒng)食品。然而，他對(duì)充滿活力的羅馬諾斯四世皇帝在 1068-71 年的戰(zhàn)役的描述表明，如果領(lǐng)導(dǎo)得當(dāng)，帝國(guó)軍隊(duì)仍然擁有秩序、紀(jì)律和凝聚力。）

????????? Byzantine armies in the middle and later 11th century were a mixture of regular mercenary units from the different parts of the empire, the older thematic soldiers, and foreign units. The growing political and cultural influence of the world around Byzantium, which had been held at bay for so long, meant that the empire was becoming more and more integrated into the tactical world of the lands around it. Byzantine order and discipline remained a significant element in the empire's armies, but the latter were a polyglot and multi-ethnic mixture of Seljuk, Pecheneg or Cuman horse archers, Norman, German and Frankish knights, Bulgarian and Anatolian light infantry, Georgians and Alans from the Caucasus, imperial guards recruited from outside the empire (Varangians, for example, from the 1070s chiefly made up of Anglo-Saxons who had left recently conquered Norman England). The Byzantine army was no longer, strictly speaking, Byzantine.

（11世紀(jì)中后期的拜占庭軍隊(duì)是來自帝國(guó)不同地區(qū)的正規(guī)雇傭軍、較老的主題士兵和外國(guó)部隊(duì)的混合體。長(zhǎng)期以來，拜占庭周圍世界的政治和文化影響力不斷增強(qiáng)，這意味著帝國(guó)越來越融入周圍土地的戰(zhàn)術(shù)世界。拜占庭的秩序和紀(jì)律仍然是帝國(guó)軍隊(duì)的一個(gè)重要元素，但后者是塞爾柱人、佩切涅格人或庫(kù)曼人弓箭手、諾曼人、德國(guó)和法蘭克騎士、保加利亞和安納托利亞輕步兵、格魯吉亞人和阿蘭人的多語言混合體。在高加索地區(qū)，從帝國(guó)以外招募的皇家衛(wèi)隊(duì)（例如，來自 1070 年代的瓦蘭吉人主要由最近離開征服諾曼英格蘭的盎格魯撒克遜人組成）。 拜占庭軍隊(duì)不再是嚴(yán)格意義上的拜占庭軍隊(duì)。）

????????? One of the tactical innovations of the period with which Byzantine soldiers and generals had to contend was the massed heavy cavalry charge favoured by the Normans. Although they were quite familiar with Norman tactics (Norman mercenaries had served in the imperial armies in Italy and Sicily in the 1030s and 1040s), the Byzantines had only rarely needed to confront it themselves. Most of the warfare they had been involved in since the 1060s had been against light-armed, highly mobile enemies such as Turks and Pechenegs. And whereas the Byzantine heavy cavalry of the later 10th century had been armed with lances and maces, they had advanced at a trot, not at the charge, with the aim of simply rolling over the enemy force facing them.

（拜占庭士兵和將軍不得不與之抗衡的那個(gè)時(shí)期的戰(zhàn)術(shù)創(chuàng)新之一是諾曼人青睞的大規(guī)模重騎兵沖鋒。 盡管他們非常熟悉諾曼人的戰(zhàn)術(shù)（諾曼人雇傭軍在 1030 和 1040 年代曾在意大利和西西里的帝國(guó)軍隊(duì)中服役），但拜占庭人很少需要親自面對(duì)它。自 1060 年代以來，他們參與的大部分戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)都是針對(duì)輕武裝、機(jī)動(dòng)性強(qiáng)的敵人，如土耳其人和佩切涅格人。 雖然 10 世紀(jì)后期的拜占庭重騎兵裝備了長(zhǎng)矛和狼牙棒，但他們以小跑而不是沖鋒前進(jìn)，目的是簡(jiǎn)單地碾壓面對(duì)他們的敵軍。）

????????? In spite of efforts under the emperors of the Komnenos dynasty, many indigenous units were re-equipped and trained in western style, so that the result was an army no different from any other multi-ethnic, polyglot mercenary army in its tactics and formations. The difference lay in the superior order and tactical dispositions of the imperial troops, when these were properly exploited by an able commanding officer, and this is still evident on occasion in the later years of the 12th century. By the middle of the 13th century, and following the fall of Constantinople to the armies of the fourth crusade, while Byzantine technical terms, titles, and names for types of unit continued to be employed in the shrinking territories of the empire, tactics, armour and weaponry were no different from those of the surrounding cultures and states with whom the Byzantines were alternately at peace and war.

（盡管在科穆尼諾斯王朝皇帝的努力下，許多土著部隊(duì)被重新裝備和西方風(fēng)格的訓(xùn)練，結(jié)果是一支軍隊(duì)在戰(zhàn)術(shù)和陣型上與其他多民族、多語言的雇傭軍沒有什么不同。不同之處在于帝國(guó)軍隊(duì)的上級(jí)秩序和戰(zhàn)術(shù)部署，當(dāng)這些被一個(gè)能干的指揮官適當(dāng)利用時(shí)，這在 12 世紀(jì)后期仍然很明顯。到 13 世紀(jì)中葉，隨著君士坦丁堡被第四次十字軍東征的軍隊(duì)攻陷，拜占庭的技術(shù)術(shù)語、頭銜和單位類型的名稱繼續(xù)在帝國(guó)、戰(zhàn)術(shù)、盔甲的收縮領(lǐng)土上使用 和武器與周圍的文化和國(guó)家沒有什么不同，拜占庭人與這些文化和國(guó)家交替處于和平和戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)狀態(tài)。）

未完待續(xù)